Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1966

In the Matter of the Estate of William Paxman,
Deceased : Brief of Respondent and CrossAppellant Vivian T. Paxman, Executrix

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Will L. Hoyt; Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, In Re: Paxman, No. 10565 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3824

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME .COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF

}

THE ESTATE OF

WILLIAM PAXMAN, Deceased

BRIE.F OF RESPONDENT .A.ND
CROSS-APPELLANT
,, .. ,,..
VIVIAN T. PAXMAN, EXECUTRIX .. : r

~.

DJS•

APPEAL FROM ORDER OF FIFTH
COURT OF UTAH IN AND FOR JU.A)J , > .
Honorable C. Nelson Day, Ju• .. ·,
~'

WILL L. Hoft·c ~.:,,
Nephi, Utah
.~ •\.:.,;·,
Attorney for
·
and Cros•:a.plJ•
Vivian T. P.
Executrix ol ._.,.
William P·~~

: · PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
State Capitol
·
Salt Lake City, Utah .
Attorney for Appellant
State Tax Commission

FI

~.

L~

·

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
'-)TATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE----------·-------------------------- 1
1-<l·-LIEF SOU(;HT HY CROSS APPELLANT -------------------- 1

STA.TEMENT OF FACTS_

------------------------------------------------------ 2

\RGUMENT __________ ··----------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
:\NSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINTS I and II ________ 4
AH_(; U MENT ON RESPONDENT'S CROSSAPPEAL
l 'ONCLUSlON

__ ----··--·-··-·········
-····--··-··-------------------.12

______________ -------------------------------------------------------.17

UT AH STA TUTES CITED
Section 59-12-35 UCA 1953 ·····-----------------------------------.3, 4
Title 59, Chapter 15, UCA 1953 ----------------------------------- 3
Title 59, Chapter 16, UCA 1953 ---------------------------------- 3
Section 74-4-3, UCA 1953 ____________ __4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 17
Section 74-4-4, UCA 1953 ---·----------------------------4, 7, 9, 17
Section 59-12-2, UCA 1953 _ ··----·---·-···----····---1,12, 16, 17

CASES CITED
L'ar<lon v. Harper et al ___ .. Utah ________ , 151 Pac 2d 99 ___________ J2
Estate of Strahan, 93 Neb. 828, 152 N.W. 678 ·---··----------------.11
In re !Jullen's Estate,47 Utah 96, 151 Pac. 533 ···--------------------.11
Ln re Green's Estate, 78 Utah 139, 142; 1 Pac. 2d 968 ... .12, 17
lu re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah 17, 187 Pac. 409 ------------·······---JO
In re Ma Ian's Estate, 10 Utah 2d 22; 347 Pac. 2d 857 ____________ 12
In re Osgood's Estate, 52 Utah 185; 173 Pac. 152 ---···-·-·-----10
In rt' Reynold's Estate, 90 Utah 415; 62 Pac. 2d 270 ------------12

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IS TllE i\IA'J1'l'ER OF
THE ~S'l1 ATE OF
\YILLIAl\l PAXMAN, Deeea:::;e<l

l

j

Case No.
10565

OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT
V l VIAN T. PAXMAN, EXEC UTRlX
BHU~l<'

S'l1..·\'11 El\IEK'l1 OF NATURE OF CASE
'1 he ap1Jeal in this case is from an order of the District Court approving inheritance tax return and fixing
amount of inheritance tax. The '11 ax Commission appealed
from that part of the order interpreting the will of the
d<>cedent and fixing the amount of inheritance tax. The
respondent executrix then cross-appealed from that part
of the order fixing inheritance tax in the amount of
$Sti9.1 () in:::;tl•ad of $521.±9 as claimed by the executrix in
lier return.
1

RELIEF SOUGH'l1 BY RESPONDENT
AND CROSS-APPELLANT
'l11ie l'l':::llJondent and cross-appellant contends that the
<:ourt':::; finding:::; and order on interpretation of the will
of deceased and deductions to be allowed were correct
and should be approved, but contends that the court
Pl'lWi in ib interpretation of Section 59-12-2 Utah Code
J~13;~ relating to rate of tax and that the amount of tax
1

as set forth in the exel'.utrix's i11l1eritanl'.e tax n~tun
towit $521.±9, is correct instead of $SG9.1G as fi.,xed IJ:
the court.
OF FACT~
Appellant'8 Brief 8et8 forth in full the Last Will anu
Testament of \Villiarn Paxman, deeeased, al8o the "At
ceptance of ~L1estarnentary Prnvisions" filed by the wid011
(executrix.), and the sections of the G tah Code involVL'u
in the appeal and cros8-aypeal. J{epetition herein i~
deemed to be unnecessary. Appellant failed to 8tate 11011
ever that the executrix's inheritance tax return was suli
rnitted to the Tax Commission prior to the filing o.f hc1
petition for approval of same by the court and that the
Commission, through its auditor, disallowed the wido1r'1
claim of deduction for her statutory interest in real
estate. This action was set forth in paragraph 9 of her
petition to the court. (R 13-15)
1

1

~'1 A'l EME~\'l'

ARGUMENT
As a preliminary to its argument on interpretation
of the decedent's will, the Tax Commission on pagef
5 and 6 of its brief appears to complain of the fact that
the District Court took primary jurisdiction of the case
and acted upon the executrix's Petition for Order Approving Inheritance Tax Return and Fixing Inheritance
Tax "without giving the Commission the preliminary
right to make an initial determination of the appropriateness of such a return on the basis of its exper
ience and expertise in this area.'' 'l'he point was urgrd
by counsel for the Commission before the trial court and
argument made that the exeeutrix had failed to exhau~t
2

ad111inistrative remedies. 'l'his was answered by reJ'\'l't:nce to Section 59-12-:35 of the Inheritance 'rax Act
\I hl('h specifically provides that:
i1f'!'

"'l'he district court liaving either principal or
ancillary jurisdiction of the settlement of the
<•state of a decedent shall have jurisdiction to hear
and determine all <1uestions in relation to said tax
that may arise affecting any devise, legacy or inheritance, or any grant or gift, or any transfer of
tith~ by right of survivornhip, under this chapter,
subject to right o.f appeal as in other cases, and
the State 'fax Commission shall represent the interests of the state in any such proceedings."
the petition filed by the executrix (R. 13-15)
rvcites in paragraph 9 that the Inheritance 'fax Return
had been submitted to the Tax Commission and approved
by it except for the item herein in dispute, it was obviously proper for the court to take jurisdiction of the
lllatter 'without calling for further consideration by the
l'ornmission. And it ought not to be assumed that the
District Court's experience and expertise in the area of
interpretation of wills and statutes is inferior to· that
of the 'l'ax Commission. In any event the section above
(1uoted gives the court and not the Tax Commission original jurisdiction and duty to hear and determine the
questions here involved. 'l'he suggestion made by counsel
that the <:~xecutrix had failed to exhaust her administrat1Y<· n·mt>dies bdore presenting her petition to the court
!'or an order approving the inheritance tax return and
fi)._ing the amount of tax is \\'ithout merit. '11he Inheritanc<' Tax Act is entirely unlil:e tlw Sales Tax Act (Chaplt'r lS of 'l'itlc 59) an<l l'sc rl'ax Act (1Chapter 10, Title
~ince

3

each if whieh provide that the Tax l'ouuuission shall
conduct hearings and maim determinations and that ib
decisions shall he final unless an appeal is taken to tlH·
~uprerne Court within thirty days.
.)!} ) ,

ln ~ection 59-12-35 supra, tht~ Legi:slature has fixed
the role of the '1'ax Connnis:sion with i·eferenee to inheritance taxes as that of partisan advocate for the state and
not judge. ln this ease the zeal and tenacity of the Commission in contending for a strained and mueasonabl~
interpretation of the testator's will and applicable statutory provisions relating thereto shows that it is not
shirking its duty a:s such advocate and that it is sparing
no effort to collect for the state the highest possible rate
and amount of inheritance tax.

AN8WER TO APPELLANrris POINTS I AND II
Section 74-4-3 Utah Code 1953 expressly gives to a
surviving wife a one-third interest in real property possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage
to which the wife has made no relinquishment of her
rights, and further provides that such one-third interest
shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she
survives him. Section 74-4-4 provides that if the husband
shall make any provision by will for the ··widow, such
provision shall be deemed to be in lieu of the distributive
share secured by Section 7 ±-4-3 unless it shall appear
from the will that the decedent designed the testamentary
provisions to be additional to such distributive share, in
which case the widow shall be presumed to have accepted
both such tPstanwntary provisions and such distributive
share.
4

Iu thi::; ca8e the widow ha8 not at any time made any
1·elinquishment of her :..;tatutory right under 8ection
74-4-3. On the contrary, 8he filed a written acceptance of
the provi8ions of the will (HA) and therein expressly
claimed her one-third interest in real estate under that
section and also claimed her right to receive all other
property left by decedent, pursuant to the provision::; of
Uw will.
H.e8pondent submits that a fair reading of the will
indubitably shows that it was the intention of the testator to give to his wife all of hi::; property and without any
intention to require her to renounce or relinquish the
right given her by statute to one-third of real estate
possessed by him during the marriage. This was submitted to the trial court in a request for a special finding
by the court upon the following question:
"Does it appear from the language of the will of
~William Paxman that he intended to devise and
bequeath all of his property to his wife, in case
she survived him, without any requirement that
she renounce or relinquish whatever right or interest was given her by law in real estate acquired
by him during the marriage~"
The Court'::; affinnative finding upon that question
is shown in the paragraph numbered 1 of the order appealed from herein, as set forth on page 3 of Appellant's
Brief towit :

'

"l. That the testator, William Paxman, intended
to and did provide by his will that his wife, if she
survived him, have all of his estate, and without
requiring her to relinquish her statutory right to
one-third of the real estate, and that such intention appears from the will of the deceased."

5

Hespondent subwits that 110 other ans\\-i•r to tlH
l:J,bove question can reasonably be given. The will is siw
ple, concise and unambiguous. It unmistakably show~
a desire on the part of the testator to give his wife all
of his property without any desire to have her forego h('J
statutory right in real estate, or to eo11qJel her to pay additional inheritanee tax by renunciation of her right in
such real estate. Counsel for the Commission argues that
the in·ovision in the will reeiting that the omission tn
provide for testatm's children is intentional and not
oceasioned by accident or mistake is "'irrelevant.'' 8urely
such argument will not be persuasive. The dechration
in the will that the omission to provide for his children
was intentional adds to proof, if additional proof is necessary, that it was the clear and deliberate desire oJ
testator to give to his wife all property of which he had
po\ver to devise or bequeath, and \\-ithout compelling
her to choose between the will and her statutory right.
In that connection \Ve should consider \vhat would hav~
been the effect of the alternative choices.
(a) If the widow had chosen to take under the will,
would there have been any effect other than to compel
payment of additional inheritance and estate tax 1 \Y ould
the testator have intended that!
( b) If the widow had elt>cted to renoUIH.'e the will and
take her statutory one-third of real estate, where would
the balance of property go'( To children who were expressly cut off by the will! Or to the ,,-idO\Y and children'!
And with additional tax burd.Pn? Did the testator inttind
such a result'?
6

l t ap1wars to Lie the oviuiou of the 'l'ax Couml.issiou
that the only way for a testator to provide for hi::; sur-

\'iving wifl, to get both her statutory right and the benpfit of a will is for the will to· provide in express words
that the provisions for the wife in the will are in addition
to the right given her by Section 7+-4-3 Utah Code AnnotatPd. Yet counsel for the Commission admits on page
9 and again on page 18 of his brief that such a construction of the statute "may create a situation where two
wives. equally loved and cared for by their husbands
might receive through his will the same amount of property, with one getting a substantial tax break over the
other simply because one husband had better legal advice
than the other, and inserted in his will a statement to the
effect that its provisions were in addition to the statutory
share under Section 74-4-3." Respondent submits that in
interpreting wills or other documents the courts look
to the substance of things and do not arbitrarily require
a particular word or phrase to be used, where the intention of the signer is plainly discernible from the language used.
In this case the trial court in its original Memorandum Decision dated October 21, 1965 (R. 19a) and in
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
Approving Inheritance Tax Return and Fixing Inheritance Tax (R. 16-17) and in its final order amending
the original order (R. 29-30) and in the accompanying
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 25-28) m
l'ach instance specifically found:

"That the testator, William Paxman, intended to
and did provide by his will that his wife, if she
7

lti.m, !rn.ve all of hi::; estate, and witJwul
re'JUiring her to relinquish her statutory right tf'
on.e-t!lird of the real esfa.t,9 7 and that such intention appe2.ni from the witH of the deceased."
~urvived

The court thereupon rightly concluded that the ~rnrviving
wife hatl the right to cfa.im and receive under the pro
visions of Section 74-4:-3 mie-third of real estate described
in the inh~::rit&nce tax retuxn) \\'ithout renouncing the will
of deceased 1 &ncl also had the right to receive all other
property left by deceased without relinquishing her rig11t
under the st3tute to cJ.~im one-third of real estate referred to.
Jn itt:J zeal to recover additional taxe::; the 'l1ax Uommil"sion argues that it b:J.s been Hs practice and policy to
deny the right of a widow to take both under the will and
uri.der the sta,tute unless the husband clearly and unequivocally states in his will that its provisions for the widow
are additio,nal to her distrib1ittive sha·re u!Ylder the statute.
(Emphi'.l. sis added) It then argues that this practice and
policy should he :recognized by the con.rt and given effect
in i::nterp.retiio.g the provisions of Section 74-4-3 and
74-4-4. Resp<0ndent submits that this is reading into a
plain and l.m.runbiguous statute a meaning never intended
by the Legisle,ture and thB.t the court will be abdicating
its responsibility if it allows such a practice of an administrative &gen.cy to control or influence its decision herein.
The st~t·:i.te does not say that the !msband must state in
his will that its p:rovisions are "in addition to the dis·
tribuive share nrcvided bv Section 74--±-3." 1t does not
say that it must "clea:dy and unambiguously" or "spe·
cifically and unequivocally" appear from the will that it8
-'-

')I

8

the wife are in addition to h~r
111 ;1!*. What Sedion 7-!--1-+ does say is simply:
pru\'1~iuJ1~ fo.r

~tatutury

1

"H the husband shall make any provision by the
w iH for the widow, such provision shall be deemed
to be in lieu of the distributive share secured by
the next preceding section 7 unless it shall appear
from the will that the decedent designed the testamentary provision to be additional to such distribuhve share, in which case the widow shall be
presumed to have accepted both such testamentary µrovisions and such distributive share."
Can any judicial tribunal say that there is any call
for rd'l•rence to administrative pr<ictice of the ta)( col1Pcting- agency in interpreting J.'\, concise and unambiguous
will such as that lwrein involved in which the testator
drdares:
"l hereby devjse and bequeath unto my beloved
wife Vivian T. Paxman, all my property and
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever nature or when•soever situated, to have and to hold
tlw same absolutely.
l hereby nominate and appoint my beloved
wife, Vivian T. Pax1m1.n, the executrix of this my
last will and testament, and direct that she serve
as such executrix withov.t bond.
l hereby declare that my omission to provide
herein for my children is intentional and not
occasioned by any ac~ident or mistal{e, and it is
my desire ~,nd will that my children now living
and also any of my children which may be born
hereafter i;hall not share in my estate."

Will the court justify the Tax Conunission in contending
that there ii' nut shown in this will a clear and unarnbig9

uou:s and une(1uivoeal intentwn

011

the part of the te:sta-

tor to give all pro11erty which he had power to devise or
bequeath to his wife if she survived him - and without
any requirement that she renounce that which the statute
gave her a8 an absolute right in lieu of dower in case she
survived him 1
Coun:sel for the Connni8sion cite8 in support of it8
contention herein the ca8es of In Re Osgood's Estate 52
Utah 185, 173 Pac. 152 and In Re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah
17, 187 Pac. 409. The Osgood ca8e is clearly not in point.
In it the will of the testator expressly provided that:
"This provision for my wife shall be in lieu of
and not in addition to her statutory interest in my
estate granted by Section 2826 Compiled laws of
Utah 1907"
In the Kohn Estate case the appeal was after decree
of final distribution and the court expressly found that
the decree was entered pursuant to petition of the executrix "in accordance with the will of the deceased" and that
the executrix (widow) intended to and did waive her right
to take under the statute and petitioned for distribution
in accordance with the will and that decree of distribution
was granted acco·rdingly. The court saying:

"It was the duty of the executrix under the law to
see to it that the estate was distributed in accordance with the will rrhe presumption is that she administered 'the estate in accordance with the
provisions of the will' Hamilton v. Hamilton, HS
Iowa, 127, 126 N.W. 776. When we thus compare
the provisions of the will with the decree of distribution, we find them to be in perfect harmony,
and the conclusion is therefore forced upon U8
10

t11at the widow not only intended to and did waive
lier right to take under the statute, but elected to
and did take under her husband's will. L"nless we
disregard all rules of construction and all presumptions herein l'l'ferred to such conclusions
seems inevitable."

'J'hat dearly distinguishes the Kohn case from the
(·ase at bar. Here the widow timely filed her declaration
tlrnt she claimed both under the statute and under the
"·ill, and that she ac<.'.epted the provisions o.f the will
without renouncing or relinquishing her right in real
('tibt<~ given by 8e<.'.. 7-1-4-3 of the Code.
The holding of this court in ln Re Bullen's 1£state,
+7 lJ tah 9G, 151 Pac. 533, should be considered in this
connection :
What the wife receives under section 2826 one-third in fee simple of all the legal and equitnble estate in real property possessed by the husband during the coverture and not relinquished
by her - she receives, not as an heir of her husband, but in her own right, something which belongs to her absolutely, and of which she could
not have been deprived by will or by any other
voluntary act of her husband without her consent.
LTnder that section, she is not an heir within the
meaning of our intestate or succession statutes.
'rhe court in that case quotes approvingly from the
I\ebraska case of Estate of 8trahan 93 Neb. 828, 1-12 N.W.
li/1-l, the following:

"lt has been held by the great weight of authority
that dower is not immune because it is dower, but
because it, like the right to the homestead and to
the distributive share of the widO"w of the estate
of her deceased husband, belonged to hf'r inchoate11

ly during hit> life, and vested fully in her at ]11 ,
death. 11he widow's share of the estate of ltl'i
deceased husband, by the present inheritancL~ lm1,
is given to her in lieu of dower, and it follO\rn that
the interest of the appellant in her deceased 1111~
band's estate, both real and personal, comet> withi 11
the test of immunity. Under the present statnt~
the wife takes her interest in the estate of her <ll·
ceased husband by operation of law. She cannot
be deprived of that interest by his will. It is SOllll'
thing which belongs to her absolutely and ind1•pendently of any right of inheritante or succl'f
sion. Strictly speaking, the widO\v's share should
be considered as immune, rather than exenqJt,
from an inheritance tax. lt iR free, rather tha11
freed, from such tax. It is not excepted from tlll'
taxable class, because it never was in such clas~.
The rule declared in the Bullen case has been repeatedly followed by this court. In re Green's Est_ate, 7~
Utah 139, 142, 1 Pac. 2d 968; In re Reynolds' Estate 911
Utah 415, 62 Pac~ 2d 270; In re Malan's Estate, 10 Utali
2d. 22, 347 Pal.'A857, and Cardon v. Harper et al (?..~
Utah SJQ 151 Pac. 2d 99.
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT'S CROS.S APPEAL
The rate of tax to be assessed against the taxable
portion of a decedent's estate is to· be determined frorn
Section 59-12-2 Utah 1Code 1953 which is set forth at
length on pages 22 and 23 of Appellant's Brief. The controversy between the Commission and the executrix is a~
to the meaning to be given to the words in the third paragraph "but on the excest> of $-±0,000.00 the rate r;hall
be as herein provided.'' The executrix contends that the
wordt> ''as herein provided" connote "as in this sediun
12

1111\'1d1·d" rather than ''m; in this paragraph provided."
( '1·rUunly tl1e words should be read and construed in
,·1111rn·etio11 with the whole section. \Vhen so construed
1t is evident that the Legislature intended a three per
(:1·nt rate on the first taxable bracket above the exemption.
Lr not so construed then the Legislature gave a lower rate
o I' tax on the first bracket above exemptions to collateral
!teirn or strangers to the blood than it did to a surviving
11 if(· and d1ildren.
1

How can this be? Merely by noting that there is an
1•'\1'lll1Jiion of $10,000.00 in favor of heirs and beneficiaries
other than the spouse and children, and tha·t the tax on
the first bra.cket above the exemption is at the rate of
U1 rec per cent. The Tax Commission contends that in
rnse of property passing to the spouse or children the
t<L"X on the first bracket of taxable estate is five per cent.
Can it he thought that the lawmakers intended such a
\\'hittling down of the exemption °? Or that they would
mtl'nd a higher rate of tax after exemptions on property
11assing to a ·widow o·r children~
'l1he executrix submits that they did not, and that
the consistent and reasonable view to take is that the
Legislature meant that the rate of tax on the portion of
an estate passing to a wife or children should be according to the same graduated brackets set up in the
~tahite, namely three per cent on the first $25,000 above
""Prnption, then five per cent on the amount in excess
of $:23,000 ::i hove the exemption up to $75,000.
If this construction is not adopted then the paragraph rPlating to the five per cent rate presents a defin13

itely contradietory probh·w in aritlm1etic and
::;ible of any certainty of interpretation.

1::; uuvo~

"Five ver cent of the amount by which the e::;tatv
exceed::; $25,000 but doe::; not exceed $75,000 except
where property not exceeding in value the ::;urn ut
$-±0,000 goes to the husband, wife or children .
. . . then in such case the exemptions shall Ul'
tl1t.• amount so going not to exceed $-±0,000, but
on the exce::;::; of $-±0,000 the rate shall be a::; herein
provided;"
That paragraph ::;hould not be com;trued a::; a statute
standing alone. Rather it should be read --with the entire
section and with the reasonable view that the Legislature would not be more generous to collateral relatives
or strangers to the blood than to the widow or children
of a decedent.
In this connection it may be asked what will be the
result in case the court rules with the Commission and
holds that the clause "but on the excess o.f $-1:0,000 the
rate shall be as herein provided'' refers specifically to
the five per cent rate mentioned in paragraph 3 and not
to the graduated rates set forth in the whole section'? Will
the Commission then be faced with the dilemma of allowing the million-dollar estate to claim that the five per
cent rate applies to all of the excess over $-10,000 passing
to a spouse or children'? lt is a ::;word that may cut both
ways, and before the court rule::; that "as herein provided"
means "as hcre£n i11 tl1i:; paragraph provided," it doubt·
lessly will consider carefully the whole section and the
object and inknt of tlw h'g·i::;latorn and will as::;ume that
they intended to make fully effective the PX-emption
14

gnutll·<i to a t:>urviving t:>pouse and (·hildren and did not

miend to whittle do>n1 that exem1)tion or require them
to pay GG-% per cent more tax on the first bracket of
taxa\Jle estate than i8 requin~d of ('Ollateral heirs or
.'lt rangers.
Counsel for the 1'ax Conuni8sion relies upon the
c.:at::<~ of In re \Valton's Estate 115 Utal1 160, 203 Pac. 2d
J'J3. That case is not in point. It did not involve an estate
ire l'Xeess of $-10,000 going to a wife, husband or children.
Jt involved an estate of the stipulated value o.f $27,000,
and the questions at issue as stated by Chief Justice
Pratt on page 394: of 203 Pacific Reporter were these:
L Does the term ''children" include grandchildren;

2. ls the life interest of the surviving son equivalent to a tr an sfer to a surviving child, thus
exempt; and

:-i. What is the exemption which should be allowed
under the section.

']_'hat which i8 said in the opinion (or in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe) relative to the rate
of tax at five per cent on estates in excess of the $40,000
exemption is clearly obiter dicta and is not binding in
this ease where the issue is directly raised. It should be
noted from Mr. Justice Wolf e's concuning opinion that
he snid: "In this case, it i8 not necessary to determine
\1 hat the rate would be if such property were in excess
of $40;000 because the whole estate is only $27;000."
Furthermore in the main opinion Chief J m;tice Pratt
(_'(Jlllllll·nted on the fact that if the contention of the 1-'ax

15

Counuission on one (1uestion argued wen' upheld it
would put the direct heirn of a decedent 'in a disadvantageous vosition comvared with collateral heirs. 'l1hat i8
the situation here if the Conm1ission's contention is su~
tained. It will mean that a higher rate of tax is imposed
upon a surviving wife on the first portion of the estate
above the e.umptiun than would be imposed upon tht~
first portion of taxable estate going to a collateral heir
or a stranger to the blood.
On behalf of the executrix it is submitted that the
Legislature never intended such result, and that the
words in the act "but on the excess of $40,000 the rate
shall be as herein provided" should be read in connection
with the whole section and construed accordingly, rather
than as if paragraph three stood alone.
lt is obvious from the language above quoted from
Chief Justice Pratt in the \V alton case that the Supreme
Court would not favor a construction which would put
a surviving wife or children of a decedent ''in a disadvantageous position compared with collateral heirs." It
is also obvious that if paragraph three of the Sec. 59-12-2
is read in connection with paragraph two - and with the
realization that the Legislature would not intend to put
a surviving spouse or children in a disadvantageous position compared to collateral heirs or strangers to the
blood then the contention asserted by the executrix herein
is correct and should be sustained.

'l1lie court will also note that it has repeatedly said
that inheritance taxes are not property taxes but taxe~
16

ttpoH the right to inherit, and that tmch taxe::; are strictly
(·01drued agairrnt the taxing power.

ln re Brown'::; Estate 3+ l"t. 73, 179 P. ()52

Larson v. l\iad\J iller 5G U t. 84, 189 P. 579
ln re Green'::; Estate 78 Ft. 139, 1-12; 1 Pac. 2d 968
lf that rule of ::;trict con::;truction against the ta.'-ing
po\\er i::; applied in con::;truing Section 59-12-2, with its
u:st:> of the word::; "as herein provided" then clearly the

eonkntion of the executrix herein should prevail.
CONCLUSION
la cmHJu::;ion re8pondent submits:
l. 'l1he will of William Paxman is unainbiguous and
:show::; an umni::;takable intent on the part of the testator
to devise and bequeath all of his property to his wife if

:she ::;urvived him, and without any intent to require her
to relinquish the right given her by Section 74-4-3 to
on1~-third of real estate owned by him during the lllB.l'r1age.

2. Sections 74--l-3 and 74--l-4 are clear, certain and
unambiguous and reference to administrative policies or
Tax Commission practiee8 is wholly uncalled for and
i nelevant.
J. Testator's surv1vmg wife did not at any time
waive or relinquish her statutory right in real estate and
did clParly and unequivocally claim such right and also
ht>r right to benefit of her husband's will.
-1:. ~ection 59-12-2 is unclear, confusing and mcon-
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t'i:;knt unll':;b tht> eou:;trudion (•011kml<•d for h~- re::;po11
dent iH adopted, but if :::;uch construdion i:::; adopted it i~
logical, rea::;onabll' and definitely eon8istent with the
spirit and intent of the Legislatun• in granting a special
exemption in favor of a surviving husband or wife or
<'hildren of a decedent.
Re8pondent and cross ap1Jellant tlwrefore sublllit~
that the order of the court approving the inheritance tax
return should be approved and affirmed excepting in
the matter of rate and amount of tax and a8 to that it
should be :::;o modified a::; to approve the rate and amount
of tax ::;et forth in the executrix's return.

WILL L. HOY'r

Attorney for Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
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